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ABSTRACT 
Using a variety of technological innovations, Google became  a 
multi-billion dollar content-delivery business without owning or 
licensing much of the content that it uses.  Google’s principal 
justification for why this strategy does not contravene the 
intellectual property rights of the copyright owners is the doctrine 
of fair use.  However, over the last several years, some copyright 
owners began to push back and challenge Google’s strategy.  Much 
of this litigation presents the courts with something of a 
conundrum.  On the one hand, it is beyond dispute that Google’s 
services have great social utility.  By organizing and making 
accessible an enormous volume of information on the Internet, 
Google facilitates broad access to a diverse array of material, a 
core value of the First Amendment.  At the same time, Google’s 
actions do not always fit comfortably within traditional notions of 
fair use.  In this respect, the Google cases present an opportunity to 
explore the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment; a subject that has received inadequate attention in the 
courts, and particularly the Supreme Court.  How the apparent 
tension between the marketplace of ideas and the commercial 
marketplace is resolved may have significant impact on the 
development of Internet-based services designed to facilitate access 
to information, and this subject is the focus of this iBrief. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Using a variety of technological innovations, Google became a 
multi-billion dollar content-delivery business2 without owning or licensing 
                                                     
1 Professor of Law and Director of the Donald E. Biederman Entertainment and 
Media Law Institute, Southwestern Law School.  I am indebted to Robert Lind 
and Lon Sobel for their helpful suggestions.  I also want to thank David 
Bodnariak for his research assistance. 
2 As of March 13, 2007, Google’s market capitalization was 137.76 billion 
dollars.  Google Finance, Mar. 13, 2007, 
http://finance.google.com/finance?q=google&hl=en (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). 
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much of the content that it uses.  Google’s various search services serve text 
and images drawn from across the Internet.  YouTube, the company’s latest 
acquisition, provides a forum for the circulation of third-party video.  And, 
in perhaps its most ambitious undertaking, Google is in the process of 
copying over three-million books in an effort to create a fully searchable 
database of the world’s literature.3   
¶2 Most of the content lying at the core of Google’s various services 
is, of course, subject to copyright protection.  Although Google has recently 
begun seriously to explore licensing arrangements with some of the 
copyright owners whose works it includes,4 to a large degree, Google 
copies and distributes others’ copyrighted works without their permission.  
Thus, for example, many of the books incorporated into Google’s 
searchable library—known as the Google Book Project—are still under 
copyright and Google has not secured permission from the owners to 
include their works.5  Similarly, much of the content accessed through 
Google’s search engines is copyright protected, and Google serves it 
without permission.6   
¶3 Google’s principal justification for why this strategy does not 
contravene the intellectual property rights of the copyright owners is the 
doctrine of fair use.  The fair use doctrine overrides the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners7 in cases where the social utility of permitting 
nonconsensual use outweighs the benefits that are perceived to accrue by 
allowing the author to control the use of a work.8  The determination is 
based primarily on four factors codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 
1976: (1) the purpose and character of the underlying use, (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the work used, 
                                                     
3 Although Google has not disclosed how much it will likely spend on the 
Library Project, one author estimated a cost in the range of 750 million dollars.  
See Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides Of The Story, 
MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CTR. BULL, at 101 (2006). 
4 Increasingly YouTube is attempting to negotiate a licensing arrangement with 
major media companies for the display of their content, but it has met with 
mixed success in these efforts.  See, e.g., Miguel Helft and Gerladine Fabrikant, 
WhoseTube? Viacom Sues Google Over Video Clips on Its Sharing Website 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C1; Geraldine Fabrikant and Saul Hansell, 
Viacom Tells You Tube: Hands Off, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at B1.  
5 See Band, supra note 3 at 90-91; Allan R. Adler, The Google Library Project, 
MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CTR. BULL, at 73 (2006). 
6 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1428632 (9th Cir. May 16, 
2007). 
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
8 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); 
Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2nd 
Cir. 1998). 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 5 
and (4) the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work.9  The 
application of these factors is notoriously amorphous,10 and fair use 
arguably does not provide the kind of predictable legal framework on which 
a company might want to base a multi-billion dollar enterprise.11  
Nevertheless, to date, Google has been relatively successful in its strategy. 
¶4 However, over the last several years, some copyright owners began 
to push back and challenge Google’s strategy.12  Two lawsuits have been 
filed challenging the Book Project.13  Google Image Search, one of its 
principal search engines, is currently in litigation with the publisher of an 
adult magazine.14  A major news service has sued Google over its news 
aggregation service.15  Additionally, YouTube was recently sued by 
Viacom for what was described as “massive intentional copyright 
infringement.”16  These litigations all challenge, or are likely to challenge, 
Google’s view of the proper scope of fair use. 17   
                                                     
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
10 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78. 
11 See generally infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
12 See, e.g., John Gapper, Microsoft attacks Google on copyright, FT.COM, Mar. 
5, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3109938c-cb61-11db-b436-
000b5df10621.html; Fabrikant and Hansell, supra note 4, at B1. 
13 Adler, supra note 5, at 73. 
14 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1428632 (9th Cir. May 16, 
2007). 
15 First Amended Complaint For Preliminary And Permanent Injunction And 
Copyright Infringement, Agence France Presse v. Google Inc., No. 
1:05CV00546 (GK) (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter AFP Complaint]. 
16 Fabrikant, supra note 4; see also Paul R. La Monica, Viacom sues ‘GooTube’ 
for $1 billion, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/13/news/companies/youtube_viacom_reaction/in
dex.htm.  YouTube actually has been the subject of at least two lawsuits that are 
likely to challenge its fair use defense.  Viacom’s March 13, 2007, claim for one 
billion dollars is the most recent.  See id.  Previously, a videographer who shot 
the now famous beating of Reginald Denny during the 1992 Los Angeles riot 
sued YouTube claiming the repeated posting of that video violated his 
copyright.  See YouTube sued over copyright infringement, ZDNET, July 18, 
2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2102-9588_22-6095736.html.   
17 The legal issues associated with YouTube are significantly different from 
those presented by Google’s search engines.  First, while YouTube may assert 
any number of defenses, principal among them is the safe harbor protection 
afforded by § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c) (2000); Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s Balancing Act: Making Money, 
Not Enemies, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, ESQ., July 10, 2006, 
http://www.hollywoodreporteresq.com/thresq/spotlight/article_display.jsp?vnu_
content_id=1002802746.  That provision effectively immunizes Internet 
websites hosting third-party material, provided they comply with certain notice 
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¶5 Much of this litigation presents the courts with something of a 
conundrum.  On the one hand, it is beyond dispute that Google’s services 
have great social utility.18  By organizing and making accessible an 
enormous volume of information on the Internet, Google facilitates broad 
access to a diverse array of material, a core value of the First Amendment.19  
At the same time, Google’s actions do not always fit comfortably within 
traditional notions of fair use.20  This tension was most clearly illustrated in 
a recent decision by the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California holding that Google Image Search exceeded the bounds of fair 
use: 
[Google Image Search is a copyright violation] despite the enormous 
public benefit that search engines such as Google provide. . . . 
[A]lthough it is appropriate for courts to consider the immense value 
to the public of such technologies, existing judicial precedents do not 
                                                                                                                       
and takedown procedures.  There are limitations to § 512 immunity, which are 
likely to be asserted in the lawsuits filed against YouTube.  See Fabrikant, supra 
note 4.  Second, although some also have argued that fair use may also provide a 
defense for YouTube, see von Lohman, supra note 17, posting substantial 
portions of others’ copyrighted works for viewing by the general public seems 
more consumptive and less transformative than the kinds of activities that are 
enabled by the use of Google’s search tools.  It also seems far more susceptible 
to resolution through traditional application of the fair use doctrine and, thus, is 
not the focus of this iBrief.  See Section III. infra.   
18 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848-49 (C.D. Cal. 2006), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 2007 WL 1428632 (9th Cir. May 16, 2007). 
19 James Madison’s oft-quoted observation is apt: “A popular Government 
without popular information, or the means of  acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a 
Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps, both.”  United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 
723 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madison, to W.T. Barry, 
Aug. 4, 1822, 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)).  The 
Supreme Court has often recognized that access to information is a fundamental 
premise underlying the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (The First Amendment “rests on the assumption 
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”); Pac. Gas and 
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“[T]he First 
Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.”). 
20 Indeed, it has been argued that the kinds of “[s]ystematic reproduction on a 
massive scale” that characterizes much of what Google and similar services do 
is “largely incompatible with the work-by-work analysis that is necessary for a 
definition of fair use” and is better addressed through other means such as 
legislation.  See Rob Kasunic, Preserving and Strengthening the Traditional 
Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS (forthcoming Spring 2007).  
This may well be the case, but at least for the time being, the only available 
solution appears to be a reasoned and sensitive application of the fair use 
doctrine.  The broader question is beyond the scope of this iBrief. 
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allow such considerations to trump a reasoned analysis of the four fair 
use factors.21
¶6 In this respect, the Google cases present an opportunity to explore 
the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment; a subject that 
has received inadequate attention in the courts and particularly the Supreme 
Court.22  How the apparent tension between the marketplace of ideas and 
the commercial marketplace is resolved may have significant impact on the 
development of Internet-based services designed to facilitate access to 
information, and this subject is the focus of this iBrief. 
¶7 Section I reviews significant litigation currently involving 
Google.23  Section II considers the relationship between First Amendment 
values and copyright doctrine.  Finally, Section III offers some thoughts as 
to how the underlying values related to both the First Amendment and 
copyright might best inform the resolution of several novel issues presented 
by the Google disputes.24  Before proceeding, however, a word of caution is 
in order.  The aims of this iBrief are relatively modest; it examines several 
ways in which First Amendment values might better inform the resolution 
of some of the Google cases—and by analogy similar cases.  It does not 
offer an analysis of a comprehensive solution to the difficult copyright 
issues that various new technologies are presenting.  Nor does it attempt to 
analyze comprehensively all aspects of the Google litigation.  Instead, this 
iBrief offers several observations as to how the First Amendment might 
usefully be employed. 
                                                     
21 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851.  The tension is further highlighted by the 
recent reversal of the district court’s fair use determination by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  See Perfect 10, 2007 WL 1428632 at 
*9-*15.  These decisions are discussed in detail infra Section III.A. 
22 See infra Section II.   
23 The review is not intended to be a comprehensive examination of all of 
Google’s litigation in this field. 
24 The focus here is principally on two issues that present interesting questions 
about the intersection of copyright and the First Amendment.  Obviously, these 
cases present many other issues which are not the subject of this iBrief. 
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I. THE GOOGLE LITIGATION 
A. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.25
¶8 Perfect 10 publishes an adult magazine featuring high-quality nude 
pictures of all-natural models.26  The magazine also has an associated 
subscription-based website featuring images of the models.27  Perfect 10 
sued Google for copyright infringement arising out of Google Image 
Search.  In response to textual searches, Google Image Search returns a 
series of reduced-size images linked to the websites from which they 
originate.28  These images, known as thumbnails, are copied by Google 
from the source, reduced in size and resolution, and stored in Google’s 
cache.29  Each image is linked to the source website and, when a user clicks 
on a thumbnail, Google retrieves the relevant webpage and displays it in a 
frame split into two horizontal sections.30  The upper frame originates from 
Google and contains the thumbnail image and information about the larger 
image.31  The lower frame displays the original webpage where the image 
resides.32  Google neither serves nor stores any of the content from the 
source website displayed in the lower frame.33 
¶9 Perfect 10 sued Google for its display of Perfect 10’s thumbnails 
and for displaying the source websites that contained Perfect 10’s images.  
Most of these source websites displayed images of Perfect 10’s models 
without Perfect 10’s permission; in other words, many of the websites that 
Google linked to were copyright infringers.34  Perfect 10 alleged that the 
exhibition of the images, both as thumbnails and from the source websites, 
directly infringed its display right protected by the Copyright Act.35  Perfect 
10 also alleged that by linking to and displaying the infringing websites, 
Google contributorily and/or vicariously infringed its copyrights.36 
                                                     
25 2007 WL 1428632 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’g in part and aff’g in part, 416 F. 
Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  In the following description of the litigation, I 
cite principally to the district court’s opinion, as it contained somewhat more 
factual detail than the decision by the court of appeals.  Where the courts differ 
as to the facts or their significance, I say so. 
26 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 832-33. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 833-34. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 834. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 837. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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¶10 As to the claims of direct infringement, the district court split the 
proverbial baby.  It ruled in Google’s favor as to the exhibition of the 
websites that were the source of the images, because those images came not 
from Google’s servers but from the source websites themselves.37  It also 
held that Google’s relationship with and activities regarding these infringing 
websites were insufficient to make it a contributory or vicarious infringer.38   
¶11 A different result was reached with respect to Google’s display of 
the thumbnails.  Because these images were stored and served by Google 
itself, it was held to be directly responsible for their display.39  Thus, since 
Perfect 10 had not consented to exhibition of the thumbnails, Google would 
be an infringer absent a defense.  The defense asserted by Google was fair 
use.40  In particular, Google relied on a decision of the Ninth Circuit in a 
strikingly similar case: Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.41  In Kelly, another search 
engine displayed thumbnail images—in that case copyrighted photographs 
of the American West—and was sued for direct infringement.42  The Ninth 
Circuit, in a decision emphasizing the public benefit inuring from search 
engines, held that such displays were fair use.43  In particular, the court 
found that in the context of Internet searches, creating and displaying 
thumbnails served a different purpose from the original images and thus, 
was transformative of and not harmful to the potential market for the 
original images.44 
¶12 Although seemingly on all fours with Kelly, the district court in 
Perfect 10 identified two principal distinctions in holding that Google’s use 
of thumbnails did not qualify as a fair use.  First, the court found that 
Google’s use of thumbnails was more commercial than Arriba Soft’s, a fact 
which it believed undermined Google’s fair-use claim.45  The court reached 
this conclusion based on Google’s business model which relied in part on 
the placement of ads on websites to which it was linking and sharing 
revenues generated by those ads with those websites.46  Second, while 
acknowledging that Google’s use of thumbnails was just as transformative 
as Arriba Soft’s,47 it further held that that it was more consumptive.48  This 
                                                     
37 Id. at 838-44. 
38 Id. at 853-58. 
39 Id. at 844. 
40 Id. at 845. 
41 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
42 Id. at 815. 
43 Id. at 818-22. 
44 Id. 
45 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846-47. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 847-48. 
48 Id. at 849. 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 5 
was the case, according to the district court, because unlike Kelly, there was 
a market for thumbnail-size images of naked models for use on cell phones 
and other portable devices.49  By serving such thumbnails, Google 
undermined that market since third parties could download the images from 
Google Image Search rather than from Perfect 10’s licensees, thus denying 
Perfect 10 revenue it might otherwise have earned. 
¶13 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on fair use, 
holding that Kelly effectively controlled the case.  In reversing, the court of 
appeals did not disagree with the district court’s view that there were 
differences between Arriba Soft’s search engine at issue in Kelly and 
Google Image Search.  However, it held that those differences were not 
substantial enough under the circumstances presented to undermine 
Google’s fair use defense.50  As to contributory infringement, the court of 
appeals disagreed with elements of the district court’s analysis and 
remanded for further consideration.51 
B. Agence France Presse v. Google 
¶14 Agence France Presse, which claims to be the second-oldest news 
agency in the world, sued Google for copyright infringement in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia.52  The case, which 
recently settled in April, 2007,53 arose out of Google News, which 
aggregates various news websites.  Google News' home page features a 
collection of headlines, short blurbs and photographs of the most significant 
news stories of the day.54  These stories are taken from various other news 
websites, and each story is linked to the website from which it originates.  
By clicking on a particular story, the user is taken directly to the originating 
website.  Unlike Google Image Search, the originating website is not 
framed; the user is taken directly to the website.  Google News also has 
search functionality operating in the same way as its other search engines. 
                                                     
49 Id. 
50 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1428632, at *12-*13 (9th Cir. May 
16, 2007). 
51 Id. at *16-*21. 
52 AFP Complaint, supra note 15, at 1-2. 
53 See, e.g., Caroline McCarthy, Agence France-Presse, Google Settle Copyright 
Dispute, CNET NEWS.COM, April 6, 2007, http://news.com.com/Agence+France-
Presse%2C+Google+settle+copyright+dispute/2100-1030_3-
6174008.html?tag=item; Juan Carlos Perez, Google-AFP Deal Unclear, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, April 9, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/AR2007040900014.html. 
54 Google News, http://news.google.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
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¶15 In its complaint, Agence France Presse alleged that Google is 
directly infringing its photographs, headlines, and textual material.55  No 
substantive decision ever issued, but it seems clear that fair use would have 
been a principal defense.56  Recently, a Belgian court held that Google 
News infringed a Belgian news service’s copyright, although given the 
differences between notions of fair use in the United States and Europe, the 
decision may not have had much bearing on the instant litigation.57 
C. The Google Book Project 
¶16 The Book Search Project may be Google’s most ambitious and 
controversial undertaking.  It involves Google scanning into its searchable 
database the full text of approximately three-million books contained in 
some of the major libraries of the world.58  The books scanned will fall into 
two basic categories: the Partner Program and the Library Project.  In the 
Partner Program, the party controlling the rights to a work authorizes 
Google to include the book; thus, this aspect of the Book Project presents 
no copyright issues.  The Library Project includes all books that Google 
does not have permission to copy.  In response to a search, the Book Project 
will return bibliographic information concerning the relevant books along 
with links to the relevant pages of the works.  By clicking on the links to 
Google-authorized partners, the user will see whatever is authorized, 
usually individual pages with the search terms highlighted.  Non-partner 
books fall into two categories.  Books in the public domain, are available in 
their entirety; in other words a user can browse the whole book, page by 
page.  For most books still covered by copyright, users will see only a few 
sentences surrounding the search term—snippets of the work.  They will not 
be able to read large sections and certain reference books—dictionaries for 
example—will display only bibliographic information.  Google will also 
display advertising on its pages, and include links that facilitate the 
purchase of the works returned by the search.  Finally, copyright owners 
who do not want their books included in the database can opt-out by 
informing Google to remove the works.59 
                                                     
55 AFP Complaint, supra note 15, at 12-14. 
56 See Perez, supra note 53. 
57 See Thomas Crampton, Google Said to Violate Copyright Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2007, available at 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/business/14google.html.  
58 See generally Band, supra note 3; Adler, supra note 5.  Except where 
indicated, the following summary is drawn from these articles. 
59 Early in the development of the Book Project, Google announced that it would 
not scan any copyrighted books from August to November 1, 2005, in order to 
give the rights holders the opportunity to opt-out of the program.  See Band, 
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¶17 In September, 2005, the Authors Guild, along with several 
individual authors, sued Google for copyright infringement.  A month later, 
five large book publishers followed suit.  Google’s actions raise two 
possible copyright issues.  First, in creating the database, Google copies and 
stores the entire text of works, thus potentially violating the copyright 
owner’s reproduction rights.  Second, in response to user searches, Google 
displays snippets from the copyrighted works.  Although Google has raised 
a number of defenses in both suits, fair use is again likely to be central to its 
effort to ward off the attacks. 
II. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
¶18 Although no appellate court adopted an independent First 
Amendment defense to claims of copyright infringement,60 there is 
recognition that free speech concerns intersect with copyright.61  The 
leading case addressing this question is Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises.62  There the Supreme Court rejected an argument that 
“First Amendment values require a different rule under the circumstances of 
the case.”63  In so doing, however, the Court made several important 
observations.  First, in many respects, copyright and the First Amendment 
serve the same objectives—the creation and dissemination of a broad and 
diverse array of information.64   Copyright seeks to accomplish this through 
the incentive of economic gain arising from control over the exploitation of 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 3 at 90-91.  Since then, Google has continued to offer an opt-out 
option.  Id. at 92-93. 
60 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-56 
(1985); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 
2003); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 
United Video v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-58 
(9th Cir. 1978); Triangle Publ’ns., Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
61 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).  There is also a 
considerable body of thoughtful scholarly literature on the subject.  See 
generally Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering 
Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971); M. Nimmer, Copyright 
and the First Amendment, 17 UCLA. L. REV. 1180 (1970); Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970). 
62 471 U.S. 539. 
63 Id. at 555-60. 
64 Compare id. at 558 (“[I]t should not be forgotten that the Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”) with Pac. Gas and Elec. 
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“[T]he First 
Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.”). 
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original works of authorship.65  The First Amendment does so by removing 
official barriers to the creation and distribution of expression.66  Second, to 
the extent the copyright owner’s monopoly over the use of his work might 
conflict with First Amendment values, two limitations on copyright 
protection serve to reconcile the competing interests.  Copyright protects 
only the expression of facts and ideas, not the facts and ideas underlying the 
expression.67  Thus, so long as one does not misappropriate the creative-
expressive elements of another’s work, copyright should not be an 
impediment to the dissemination of information.  Additionally, the “latitude 
for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use” acts to 
ensure that competing proprietary and expressive interests remain in 
balance.68 
¶19 The Nation case arose out of peculiar circumstances where the 
underlying First Amendment interests, while superficially seductive, were 
actually not particularly compelling.  The publisher of former President 
Gerald Ford’s memoirs authorized Time magazine to publish excerpts of the 
book shortly before it was released.69  However, before Time magazine 
could do so, the Nation magazine secured a purloined copy of the book and 
scooped Time by excerpting it.70  As the court recognized, what was at issue 
was the right of first publication, and not the issue of whether the excerpts 
or the work itself would be published: “Where an author and publisher have 
invested extensive resources in creating an original work and are poised to 
release it to the public, no legitimate aim is served by pre-empting the right 
of first publication.”71 
¶20 Thus, the Court rejected a broad rule “for expanding the doctrine of 
fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.”72  
However, it did not wholly reject the idea that the interpretation and 
application of the traditional fair use factors should not be informed, where 
appropriate, by the First Amendment values that animate them.  Indeed, in a 
later case, the Court at least hinted that, in the right case, First Amendment 
values might well influence the interpretation of the fair use defense: “The 
fair use doctrine thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid 
                                                     
65 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 558. 
66 Id. at 559. 
67 Id. at 560. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 542-43. 
70 Id. at 543. 
71 Id. at 557. 
72 Id. at 560. 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 5 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity which the law is designed to foster.’”73 
¶21 Even more recently, the Court “laid to rest the longstanding 
assumption that copyright is necessarily free from First Amendment 
scrutiny.”74  In Eldred v. Ashcroft,75 the Court again suggested that the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine serve to protect First 
Amendment interests.76  To reject completely any consideration of First 
Amendment values would simply be inconsistent with the underlying 
objective of the “Framers [who] intended copyright itself to be the engine of 
free expression.”77 
¶22 There are, of course, practical difficulties in relying too heavily on 
fair use to protect First Amendment values.  The First Amendment requires 
a degree of certainty and predictability in the application of legal doctrine to 
provide the necessary “breathing space” in order for the idea marketplace to 
flourish.78  Fair use, on the other hand, is a notoriously amorphous doctrine.  
As David Nimmer observed: “Basically had Congress legislated a dart 
board rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the 
Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same.”79 
¶23 Moreover, Professor Rob Kasunic, in a thoughtful examination of 
the intersection between copyright and the First Amendment, laments “the 
fact that courts do not routinely acknowledge the important relationship 
between fair use and free speech values . . . is itself disconcerting.”80  
Nevertheless, while far from a perfect solution, for the time being at least, 
fair use appears to offer the best option for addressing the issues that are 
presented by these cases, and it is useful to consider how that doctrine might 
be applied in a way that is sensitive to the underlying exigencies of a robust 
speech marketplace. 
                                                     
73 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
74 Kasunic, supra note 20. 
75 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
76 See id. at 219. 
77 Id.  
78 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964). 
79 David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003). 
80 Kasunic, supra note 20. 
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III. HARMONIZING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FAIR USE IN THE 
GOOGLE LITIGATION 
¶24 The various Google cases present a wide variety of fair use issues, 
some mundane and some quite challenging.  The remainder of this iBrief 
focuses on the latter.  Before doing so, however, it is important to state that 
I do not mean to suggest that all, or even most, of the Google litigation will 
require a rethinking of fair use doctrine to account for First Amendment 
values.  Indeed, the case that one might think raises the most serious First 
Amendment questions—the Agence France Presse suit over Google 
News—strikes me as the easiest of the lot, at least from a fair use 
perspective.  Although it involves news reporting, a subject that particularly 
raises one’s First Amendment hackles,81 the suit by Agence France Presse 
fits relatively comfortably into a traditional fair use model, which would ask 
whether Google’s service transforms the copyright owner’s news stories or 
usurps its market for news headlines and excerpts from news articles.  
Assuming such things are copyrightable,82 the case has significant parallels 
to a number of other news-related fair use decisions and does not appear to 
present any particularly novel difficulties.83 
¶25 The Perfect 10 v. Google and Book Project litigations do not seem 
nearly so simple.  These cases, as the district court noted in Perfect 10, 
present nonconsensual uses which can be seen as both transformative and 
consumptive at the same time.84  To some degree they involve wholesale 
copying of creative works, factors which ordinarily weigh against fair use 
protection.85  Yet, at the same time, there is an undeniable pro-speech 
public benefit from Google’s activities; Google’s various search engines 
allow users to more effectively harness the raw potential of the Internet and 
                                                     
81 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
758-59 (1985) (declaring that speech on issues of public concern is “at the heart 
of the First Amendment’s protection.” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
82 Google argued that the headlines and excerpts taken from Agence France 
Presse’s stories are non-copyrightable facts.  See Google’s Motion And 
Memorandum For Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Count II, Agence 
France Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:5cv00546 (GK) (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2005). 
83 See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 
65, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1999) (abstracting and translating news articles is not fair 
use); Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.2d 1119 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (using competitor’s news video is not fair use); Los Angeles Times v. 
Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (posting of news 
stories by an on-line bulletin board is not fair use). 
84 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 849 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 2007 WL 1428632 (9th Cir. May 16, 2007). 
85 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
449-50 (1984). 
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everything it contains.  Without them—and other similar services—access 
to relevant information would undoubtedly be more elusive.   
¶26 Two aspects of these cases stand out as presenting particularly 
interesting and significant issues involving the intersection of fair use and 
the First Amendment.  Both revolve around the potential conflict between 
the commercial side of copyright—encouraging creative expression by 
protecting commercial exploitation of works—and the speech side—
permitting certain productive uses that benefit the public to trump the 
owner’s proprietary interest.  The first issue raises the question of when an 
otherwise fair use should be overcome because the actions of the “fair user” 
might, in some respect, contribute to or facilitate unlawful infringements by 
third parties.  This issue is seen most clearly in Perfect 10.  The second 
issue—presented by the Book Project cases—relates to the fourth fair use 
factor—the effect a use has on a potential market—and asks how substantial 
the market must be in order to hold significant weight.  Each is addressed in 
turn. 
A. Contributory Infringement as a Factor in Fair Use Analysis 
¶27 As discussed above, the litigation involving Perfect 10 was not the 
first time the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the fair use implications of 
the use of thumbnail images to facilitate Internet search.  Several years 
earlier, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft,86 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
sustained another search engine’s fair use defense under similar 
circumstances.  Thus, unless there is a material distinction, Kelly should 
have controlled the outcome of Perfect 10’s claims. 
¶28 The district court found two such distinctions, which, in its view, 
undermined Google’s claim of fair use.  First, Google’s AdSense 
advertising program allowed third-party websites, which Google linked to, 
to carry Google-sponsored ads and share in the revenue from them.  The 
result, as the court noted, was “[i]f third-party websites that contain 
infringing copies of [Perfect 10’s] photographs are also AdSense partners, 
Google will serve advertisements on those sites and split the revenue 
generated from users who click on the Google-served advertisements.”87 
Notwithstanding Google’s policy prohibiting the display of AdSense 
advertisements on pages containing images that appeared in Google Search 
results, the court found that Google failed to present evidence supporting 
enforcement of this policy while Perfect 10 offered “numerous screenshots 
of third-party websites that serve infringing content and also appear to be 
receiving and displaying AdSense ads from Google.”88  In effect, the court 
                                                     
86 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
87 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 
88 Id. at 846-47. 
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discounted Google’s claim of a fair use defense because its search engine 
was more commercial than Arriba Soft’s in that it was indirectly profiting 
from infringing content and assisting infringing websites in their efforts to 
profit as well.   
¶29 Second, in evaluating the effect on Perfect 10’s potential market, 
the district court found that that unlike the photographs in Kelly, there was a 
market for the Perfect 10 thumbnails for downloads to cell phones and other 
portable devices.  Since Google’s serving these thumbnails could be viewed 
as assisting third parties in obtaining such images without having to pay 
Perfect 10, or its thumbnail licensee, the court viewed Google’s actions as 
undermining the market.89 
¶30 The similarity between both of the distinctions offered by the 
district court is readily apparent. In each case Google was effectively held 
responsible, not for its own conduct, but for the unlawful activities of third-
party infringers: in the case of its AdSense program, the websites that 
pirated Perfect 10’s photographs, and in the case of users of its search 
technology, those who downloaded the images to other devices. 
¶31 Although the court of appeals reversed the district court, its analysis 
appeared to accept that the two distinctions the district court relied on 
might, in the right case, justify rejection of a fair use defense.  Rather than 
rejecting the relevance of these distinctions, the court of appeals simply 
took issue with the district court as to their relative importance in the 
context of this particular “case-specific analysis of fair use.”90  As to third-
party downloads of Perfect 10’s images to cell phones, the court noted that 
“the district court did not find that any downloads for mobile phone use had 
taken place.”91  Similarly, in regard to the AdSense program, the court 
emphasized the absence of any determination “that this commercial element 
was significant.”92 
                                                     
89 Id. at 849. 
90 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1428632, at *12 (9th Cir. May 16, 
2007). 
91 Id.  The court of appeals dismissed Perfect 10’s argument that cell phone 
downloads harmed its  potential market because any such concern was only 
“hypothetical.”  Id. at *14.  Yet because the fourth fair use factor considers 
potential as well as actual market harm, it is not clear why the hypothetical 
possibility that a real market was being undermined is, in itself, fatal to the 
argument.  
92 Id. at *12.  The court of appeals conclusion in this respect is somewhat 
curious in that if found that the AdSense program as a whole contributed “’$630 
million or 46% of total revenues’ to Google’s bottom line.”  Id. at *12 (quoting 
Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. at 847 & n.12).  It discounted this figure, however, 
because it did not “break down the much smaller amount attributed to  websites 
that contain infringing content.”  Id.   If, in fact, this was the basis for the court’s 
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¶32 In considering the relevance of these two factors to the fair use 
analysis, several facts need to be kept in mind concerning the nature of 
Google’s actions.  First, neither the district court nor the court of appeals 
suggested that Google authorized or encouraged third parties to infringe 
Perfect 10’s photographs.  Second, any connection Google had with these 
infringements was indirect at best.  To be sure, the third-party website 
infringers were better off financially as a result of the AdSense program, but 
that program was not in any sense predicated on supporting infringing 
websites.  Indeed, it was largely blind to the particular activities of the 
websites where the ads were placed.  And while the district court was 
correct that Google “has a strong incentive to link to as many third-party 
websites as possible—including those that host AdSense advertisements,”93 
it does not benefit in any particular way from the fact that a website may 
engage in infringing activities.  It treats all of its AdSense partners the same.   
¶33 Similarly, there was no suggestion that Google either authorized 
users of its search results to download any of its thumbnail images or 
provided the technological functionality to do so.  In fact, the functionality 
to download the pictures came from the users’ own web browsers, not from 
Google.94 
¶34 Notwithstanding Google’s rather tenuous connection with any 
third-party infringement, both the district court and the court of appeals 
accepted that an otherwise valid fair use defense to providing technology—
a search engine and ad-sharing software—could be undermined if providing 
that technology might, to some degree, facilitate infringing activities by 
third parties.  In this sense, then, the theoretical moorings of a fair use 
defense in such circumstances differ from those applicable to most fair use 
cases, which turn on the harm caused directly by the party claiming fair use, 
not someone else.  Here, Google’s actions are more analogous to the cases 
following from Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,95 
which involved claims that the manufacturers or distributors of various 
technological devices or services were liable for contributory infringement 
for inducing or materially contributing to illegal activities by third parties.96  
                                                                                                                       
disagreement with the district court’s reasoning, one might think that the more 
appropriate course of action would be to remand the case for additional findings 
of fact.  Paradoxically, the court of appeals did the opposite, holding that 
“[b]ecause the district court here ‘found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the 
statutory factors . . . [w]e need not remand for further fact-finding.”  Id. at *15. 
93 Perfect 10, 416 F.Supp. at 847. 
94 Id. at 854. 
95 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 
(1984). 
96 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005). 
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¶35 What makes the Perfect 10 decisions all the more curious and 
problematic is that both courts  reviewed these contributory infringement 
decisions in connection with Perfect 10’s allegation of contributory 
infringement arising out of Google’s linking to infringing websites, which 
then displayed the images in a Google frame.  Perfect 10 made essentially 
the same arguments in this context that it did in its direct infringement 
case—that AdSense and serving up thumbnails contributed to third-party 
infringement97—but here the district court rejected Google’s contribution as 
insufficient to support contributory liability,98 while the court of appeals 
appeared to acknowledge that Perfect 10 might be able to make its case.99  
Perfect 10 relied principally on cases involving peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks that were held liable for contributory infringement,100 but the 
district court went to considerable lengths to distinguish the infringement on 
a “massive scale”101 that characterized these other decisions from Google’s 
far more limited role.102  On the other hand, the court of appeals 
acknowledged that while “Google did not provide a significant revenue 
stream to the infringing websites,” it nonetheless might be held liable 
because it “substantially assists websites to distribute their infringing copies 
to a worldwide market and assists a worldwide audience of users to access 
infringing materials.”103  Thus, there is a significant disconnect between 
                                                     
97 See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 852-55; A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
98 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d. at 851-56.   
99 2007 WL 1428632 at *19. 
100 Perfect 10, 416 F.Supp. at 852-53. 
101 Id. at 852. 
102 See id. at 852-56. 
103 Perfect 10, 2007 WL 1428632 at *19.  Although full consideration of 
theories of contributory infringement is beyond the scope of this iBrief, it at 
least bears note that the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the issue seems at odds with 
the Supreme Court’s approach articulated in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  Read literally, the court of appeals 
opinion in Perfect 10 would appear to contemplate that contributory liability 
could be imposed if Google had “knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images 
were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent 
further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”  
2007 WL 1428632 at *19.  Grokster, to the contrary, seemed to contemplate a 
much higher threshold of culpability.  First, the overall tenor of the Supreme 
Court’s decision appeared to comprehend liability only in the more “acute” 
cases involving “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.”  545 U.S. at 932, 
937.  Moreover, the court seemed clear in its resolve not to permit liability to be 
imposed merely because a system’s design allowed for infringement, even 
where the designer knew that infringing activity was taking place: “Accordingly, 
just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the 
VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of 
infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough to subject a 
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both aspects of Perfect 10’s claims—direct versus contributory infringement 
liability—as well as the logical consistency of each court’s treatment of 
those respective claims .   
¶36 As to the district court’s reasoning, if, on the one hand, Google’s 
activities regarding third-party infringers were insufficient to support 
contributory liability, why were they enough to defeat a fair use claim?  
Conversely, as to the court of appeals analysis, if Google’s actions do not 
significantly contribute enough to support a claim of direct infringement (by 
defeating a fair use defense) how, then, can these same activities suddenly 
rise to a level sufficient to support indirect contributory liability?   
¶37 It is true that Google’s actions in Perfect 10 differed in at least one 
respect from those at issue in the Sony line of cases: Google itself actually 
copied and displayed Perfect 10’s copyrighted images, qualifying it as a 
direct infringer absent some defense.  But is that a distinction with any 
difference in circumstances like this?  If one accepts the wisdom of the 
Ninth Circuit’s Kelly decision, then there was nothing inherently 
problematic with Google’s operation of a search engine utilizing thumbnail 
versions of copyrighted photographs; in other words, the socially useful act 
of creating thumbnail images for use in Internet search ordinarily qualifies 
as a fair use.  It was only the putative connection between Google and the 
third-party infringers that, in the district court’s view, mandated a different 
result.   
¶38 In considering whether Google (or any search engine for that 
matter) should be charged in this context with the transgressions of others, 
there may be a useful analogy to First Amendment doctrine.  Copyright 
issues aside, controversial speech can often lead listeners to act in ways that 
                                                                                                                       
distributor to liability.”  Id. at 937.  Although the Court did cite the failure of the 
alleged infringer in Grokster to develop filtering tools to combat infringement, it 
did so against a background of massive infringement and clear intent to 
encourage such conduct, while making clear that “in the absence of other 
evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement 
liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent 
infringement, if the device was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.  Such 
a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor.”  Id. at 939 n.12.  In this 
respect, then, the district court’s thoughtful analysis of the contributory 
infringement cases would seem far more consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence than with the court of appeals’ treatment of the issue.  The 
importance of this issue in the Perfect 10 litigation may be minimized by 
application of § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which may 
provide Google with a safe harbor against Perfect 10’s infringement claims.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 512(d).  The district court did not reach that issue and, in its remand, 
the court of appeals directed that it be considered.  See 2007 WL 1428632  at 
*21. 
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are socially undesirable.  While most people who watch violent movies or 
play violent videogames return without incident to their normal lives, some 
find such activities to be an exhortation to commit crimes or other harmful 
acts.104  In evaluating whether the First Amendment is a bar to imposing 
liability on a speaker who may bear some indirect responsibility for such 
violence, the courts have fashioned a fairly rigorous standard that, in most 
instances, does not permit the independent actions of third parties to be 
charged to the speaker.  Only where the speaker intends to cause such harm 
by his speech and speaks in a way that is likely to bring about that harm 
imminently, will liability attach.105  Otherwise, the courts have recognized, 
too much useful expression might be deterred.106 
¶39 By the same token, imposing too much responsibility on an 
otherwise fair user might well deter reliance on that defense.  In the peer-to-
peer file-sharing cases, which present the closest analogy to Perfect 10, the 
courts imposed liability in circumstances where there was massive third-
party infringement substantially encouraged by defendants.107  Where such 
significant indicia of complicity are not present, courts are far more 
reluctant to hold a relatively innocent party responsible for potentially 
infringing actions of others.108 
                                                     
104 See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Byers v. 
Edmonson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
105 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Herceg, 814 F.2d 
at 1022.  But see Rice v. Palladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242-50 (4th Cir. 
1997) (holding an instructional manual intended to cause harm could be subject 
to aiding and abetting liability without a showing that harm was imminent). 
106 See, e.g., Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024. 
107 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 852.  In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005), the Supreme Court appeared to impose a 
similarly high burden, holding that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or 
of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to 
liability.  [T]he inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful 
culpable expression and conduct . . . .” 
108 See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706-07 (2d 
Cir. 1998).  A line of cases involving the operation of computer bulletin boards 
and other technologically-based services also presents a useful analogy.  As one 
district court explained in another case involving Perfect 10:  
Computer technology, and in particular the Internet, has created a 
challenge to copyright’s strict liability scheme.  Because of the 
architecture of the web and the workings of computer technology, 
almost any business that utilizes computer hardware to create access to 
the Internet or to store content may find its hardware creating or 
displaying infringing material as a result of decisions by third-parties 
(the system’s users) without the business doing any truly volitional 
actions.  
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¶40 It is true, perhaps, that in the Perfect 10 cases, Google was in a 
position to exert some control over the third party’s infringing actions.  
Perhaps Google could simply refuse to place ads on other websites 
connected with infringing images or could post only textual responses to 
search queries.  But should it have to?109  As the district court recognized, 
Google’s search tools are enormously beneficial to the public.  The actions 
that might prevent the activities of these infringers might also compromise 
the utility or effectiveness of search technology, either by undermining 
Google’s economic model or by making searches less complete or useful.  
The ultimate question here is whether, absent some truly purposeful conduct 
designed to encourage or facilitate infringement, the actions of unrelated 
third-party infringers—when judged against the utility of Internet search as 
a whole110—require that we throw the proverbial baby out with the bath 
water.  If one takes into account the underlying First Amendment values 
promoted by fair use, it seems the likely answer should be no. 
¶41 In addition to the doctrinal concerns arising from the treatment of 
fair use in the Perfect 10 cases, the court of appeals’ analysis of the issue 
raises an additional concern.  As I discussed in Section II, an important 
element of any First Amendment-based rule is a degree of certainty in its 
application sufficient to allow parties to predict the consequences of their 
actions.  Absent predictability, speakers may tend to forgo protected 
expression so as to avoid liability, or the expense of proving their case.111   
¶42 Although fair use is a notoriously amorphous doctrine, the court of 
appeals’ application of it in Perfect 10 is particularly problematic.  At 
bottom, the court’s decision is predicated on its view that Google’s alleged 
                                                                                                                       
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1167 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002).  In such instances, courts have refused to impose direct infringement 
liability on such passive conduct absent some other element of volition or 
encouragement of infringement.  See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. 
Supp 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
109 It is worth noting that in Grokster, the Court recognized that the mere failure 
to take affirmative steps to counteract known third parties’ infringing activities 
is an insufficient basis for contributory liability.  See 545 U.S. at 939 n.12. 
110 In making this argument I do not intend to minimize the harm that these 
third-party infringers cause companies like Perfect 10, which has litigated 
aggressively to prevent such piracy.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. 
Supp. 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. 
Supp. 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  The question, however, is who should bear the 
burden in cases like this, and in answering that question, a broader view of the 
issue is appropriate in my view. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 78. 
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contribution to infringing conduct was “not significant at present.”112  The 
court offers no clues as to when such activity might cross the “significance” 
threshold.  What if Perfect 10 were able to show a number of actual cell 
phone downloads from infringing websites?  And if it could, how many 
downloads would be significant?  Similarly, what if one percent of Google’s 
AdSense revenue came from websites that contained infringing material?  
According to the court of appeals’ opinion, this would amount to $6.3 
million.  Is this significant?  Moreover, must there be a direct connection 
between the generation of that revenue and the infringing material, or is the 
mere presence of infringing material on an AdSense-partner website 
enough?  These and any number of other questions spring from the court of 
appeals’ decisions, and it is precisely these kind of imponderables that have 
a tendency to chill expression.  If the fair use doctrine is truly going to be a 
principal mechanism for reconciling free speech and copyright, this kind of 
relativistic analysis needs to be banished from the lexicon.  
B. How Real and Significant Must a Market Be to Undermine the 
Case for Fair Use Protection?  
¶43 The Google Book Project litigation presents an equally interesting 
and important issue as to the scope of fair use in regard to the effect on the 
copyright owner’s market for his work: What constitutes the kind of market 
that a copyright owner is entitled to exploit to the exclusion of others? 
¶44 Harm to the potential market for a copyrighted work is a key factor 
in the fair use equation.113  Copyright seeks to encourage creation through 
economic incentive; thus, any action that materially diminishes that 
incentive is to some degree at odds with the theoretical underpinnings of the 
protection of original works of authorship.114   
¶45 Difficulties in defining relevant copyright markets are not new, and 
are complicated by the fact that potential, as well as actual, markets are 
relevant in evaluating fair use claims.115  What constitutes a potential, yet 
                                                     
112 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1428632, at *12 (9th Cir. May 16, 
2007). 
113 The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say market harm is “undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use.”  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).  More recently, however, the Court 
has backed away from giving such presumptive weight to any one factor.  See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
114 This principle is not without its limits, as “[t]he primary objective of 
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8). 
115 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
566-67 (1985). 
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unexploited, market is a question that commonly engenders significant 
debate.  At times the debate over what is a potential market takes on an air 
of circularity.  Fair users’ arguments that no potential market exists for a 
particular use are often met with the copyright owner’s response that users’ 
need for the material itself demonstrates the existence of a potential market.  
For example, this argument was advanced in a case arising out of CNN’s 
unauthorized use of a clip from a Robert Mitchum movie in a television 
obituary.116  The court upheld CNN’s fair use claim because there was no 
demonstration that a real and substantial licensing market existed for such 
uses.117 
¶46 The court’s decision was consistent with the prevailing rule that 
only potential markets that are “traditional, reasonable or likely to be 
developed” are relevant to fair use analysis.118  While this standard is 
admittedly vague, First Amendment values underlying copyright can be 
useful in confining it so that the proper balance is struck between the 
copyright owners’ economic incentive and the public’s interest in access to 
diverse information.119  This balance is likely to play out in a particularly 
interesting way in the Book Project litigation. 
¶47 Book publishers will undoubtedly argue that they have a right to 
licensing revenues for the copying and use of their works in Internet search 
databases.  They will certainly cite to the Partners Program where Google 
licenses books for its database in support of this argument.  Nevertheless, as 
the courts recognized, “a publisher’s willingness to pay license fees . . . 
does not establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative, make fair 
use [of the work].”120 
¶48 On the other hand, as at least one commentator recognized, it may 
be difficult for the book publishers to argue effectively that they are being 
denied a real and substantial market, since “the value of a license with 
respect to any particular book would be relatively small.”121 This is because 
the value of Internet book search lies in the aggregation of works and the 
technology used to sort them.  For example, unlike a popular musical 
composition which has intrinsic stand-alone value in the licensing market, 
                                                     
116 See Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 2001 WL 
1518264, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).  
117 Id.  
118 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 
2006), (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930  (2d 
Cir. 1994)). 
119 See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804-05 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
120 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 615; see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994).  
121 See Band, supra note 3, at 104. 
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an individual book, no matter how successful, has little value as a stand-
alone database.  It is only the aggregation of large numbers of works that 
has value. 
¶49 Indeed, in terms of its utility for Internet search, a book’s value 
does not derive from its expressive elements.  Rather it is the fact of its 
existence that is important.  In other words, an Internet search engine views 
books as data or information, which may or may not be responsive to a 
particular query.  The creativity, artistry or popularity of the underlying 
expression, while perhaps of interest to the party conducting the search, is 
largely irrelevant to the search engine.  In this respect, books in a database 
are being used as part of the informational universe of facts, not for their 
expressive worth.   
¶50 As discussed earlier, a fundamental premise of reconciling 
copyright and First Amendment interests is that facts and information are 
not protected.  A reasonable corollary to this principle might be that uses of 
copyrighted works trading on their informational rather than expressive 
value should not present the kind of market harm that will defeat a claim of 
fair use.122  Thus, in evaluating Google’s claim of fair use, there is a serious 
question as to whether the kinds of harm the publishers are likely to assert 
should be cognizable in evaluating Google’s likely fair use argument. 
CONCLUSION 
¶51 Although it is now well settled that there is a relationship between 
copyright and the First Amendment, there is a dearth of case law defining 
precisely how the latter may act to define the reach of the former.  Perhaps 
this is due to the fact that those cases coming closest to raising the potential 
conflict between proprietary and public interests were resolvable through 
the application of traditional copyright principles.  In at least some respects, 
some of the Google cases seem less susceptible to neat solutions.  
Ultimately, Professor Kasunic may be correct that legislative or other means 
will be necessary to deal with these problems.  However, for the time being 
it may be worth exploring whether, and to what extent, First Amendment 
doctrine might help to shape the resolution of these disputes.  The Supreme 
Court is not blind to the fact that technology may create a need for a new 
gloss on traditional fair use doctrine, “especially during a period of rapid 
technological change.”123  While this iBrief offers several modest 
suggestions for how that might be done within the context of existing law, it 
may not completely resolve the difficult issues that the courts are facing.  
                                                     
122 See Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 615 (“[C]opyright owners may not 
preempt exploitation of transformative markets . . . .”) (quoting Castle Rock 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
123 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984). 
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However, these suggestions may help make the problems somewhat more 
tractable.  
